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ARGUMENT 
I. The Rule of Strict Construction of Tax Exemptions does not 
Authorize the Commission to Interpret Statutory Language Unreasonably or 
to Add Requirements not Found in the Statute. 
Quoting Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 
P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980) the Commission's brief states the rule of construction 
applying to tax exemptions: "Statutes which provide for exemptions should be 
strictly construed, and one who so claims has the burden of showing his 
entitlement to the exemption." (Br. of Appellee at 8.) However, the Commission 
failed to include the very next sentence from Parson: "Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, there is also to be considered the over-arching principle, applicable to 
all statutes, that they should be construed and applied in accordance with the intent 
of the Legislature and the purpose sought to be accomplished." Parson, 617 P.2d at 
398. 
In support of this statement, the Parson Court cited 71 Am.Jur.2d, State and 
Local Taxation, § 326. Id. at n.8. After stating the general rule of strict 
construction, that same section of Am. Jur. continues: 
On the other hand, it has been said that the rule of strict construction 
of exemption provisions does not mean that there should not be a 
liberal construction of the language used in order to carry out the 
express intention of the fundamental lawmakers and the legislature, 
but rather that the property which is claimed to be exempt must 
come clearly within the provisions granting such exemption. 
Moreover, even a strict construction should be reasonable and 
should not defeat the intention expressed by the words used in the 
provision conferring the exemption" (emphasis added). 
In Bonneville International Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 
1045, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) the Commission relied upon the Parson 
statement regarding strict construction of sales tax exemptions to support its 
narrow interpretation of another SIC Code and the statute granting the 
manufacturing exemption at that time. However, ruling that the "plain language" 
of the SIC Code should be applied, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
Commission and stated: "An agency may not alter the effect of a statute by 
adopting an interpretation that imposes additional terms not found in the statute." 
Id. atn.6. 
In this case, the Commission is relying upon the rule of strict construction 
and the burden of proof to excuse the Auditing Division's failure to present 
substantial evidence upon which the Commission's ruling could be based, as well 
as its own failure to weigh the substantial evidence placed in the record by Atlas. 
However, if the statute and relevant SIC Codes are reasonably construed to give 
effect to the actual language adopted by the legislature, the evidence clearly 
supports a ruling that Atlas qualifies for the sales tax manufacturing exemption. 
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II. The Commission's Reliance upon a "Primary Activity" Test is 
Inconsistent with Utah Law and Improperly Restricts the Manufacturing 
Sales Tax Exemption. 
In its ruling, the Commission quoted the following statement from the 
introduction to the SIC Manual: "'[Each] operating establishment is assigned an 
industry code on the basis of its primary activity, which is determined by its 
principal product or group of products produced or distributed, or services 
rendered.'" (R. at 25.) In its brief, the Commission repeatedly refers to the need to 
determine primary activity under the SIC Manual. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellee at 7-
12.) However, like the Commission's "best described in" test, the words "primary 
activity" are not found in either the statutory language of the sales tax exemption 
or the Commission's own rules; nor are they part of the Manufacturing Division of 
the SIC Manual, which is the only part of the Manual expressly incorporated by 
Utah law.1 As discussed in Atlas' opening brief, the statute simply calls for a 
1
 Although the distinction may not be significant, it is worth noting that SIC 
Codes 3313 and 3399, the two codes in the Manufacturing Division that most 
closely describe Atlas' activities, do not actually use the words "primary activity" 
but instead apply to establishments that are "primarily engaged in manufacturing" 
the specified product. 
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determination whether a particular establishment is "described in" the 
Manufacturing Division. 
In addition, the Commission's brief overemphasizes the significance of the 
term "primary activity" as used in the SIC Manual, which only serves to confuse 
the real issues in this case. For example, the Commission's brief states: "These 
provisions clearly show that SIC classifications must reflect the 'primary activity' 
of the business, or as the Commission interpreted the 'primary activity* provision, 
the code that 'most accurately describes the establishment in question'" (Br. of 
Appellee at 9-10.) 
The determination of an establishment's primary activity is certainly a first 
step in assigning the proper SIC Code to that establishment. However, the initial 
determination of a primary activity is not the same thing as the actual assignment 
or classification itself. The introduction to the SIC Manual states that each 
establishment "is assigned an industry code on the basis of its primary activity, 
which [primary activity] is determined by [the establishment's] principal product 
or group of products produced or distributed, or services rendered.'" (R. at 25.) 
This definition has two simple parts. First, the establishment's primary 
activity is determined by identifying its principal product or group of products— 
i.e., the group of products that the establishment spends most of its time and 
resources producing. The record is replete with evidence, including the 
Commission's own findings of fact (see Finding of Fact No. 8), that Atlas' 
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principal product is ferrous and non-ferrous metals. (R. at 11.) Producing these 
metals is Atlas' primary activity—that has never been at issue in this case. 
Second, after the primary activity has been identified, the SIC Manual assigns an 
industry code to the establishment on the basis of that primary activity. By 
continually confusing the initial identification of a primary activity with the 
ultimate assignment of an industry code, the Commission has obscured the true 
issues in this case. 
In addition, without any supporting evidence, the Commission based its 
conclusion that the SIC Manual "rejected the option of using multiple codes" on 
the Manual's introductory statement about primary activity. (R. at 25.) However, 
in actual practice, the Utah Department of Employment Security (the agency 
responsible for assigning industry codes) apparently disagrees with the 
Commission's interpretation. According to the Commission's third finding of 
fact, "the Utah Department of Employment Security (DES) has classified the 
Petitioner as primarily involved in two standard industrial classification (SIC) 
areas, which are [5015 and 5093]." (R. at 10 (emphasis added).) 
Even if the Commission's assertion that the SIC Manual permits 
assignment of only one industry code per establishment were correct, imposing 
such a classification system upon the sales tax exemption statute is an 
unreasonable construction of Utah law. The statutory language says absolutely 
nothing about assigning industry codes under the SIC Manual, nor does it refer to 
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any portion of the Manual other than the Manufacturing Division. (Br. of 
Appeallant at 12.) As discussed in Atlas' opening brief, the legislature could easily 
have limited the sales tax exemption to establishments "classified in" the 
Manufacturing Division. However, it instead chose to grant the exemption to all 
establishments "described in" that Division. There is no reason why the plain 
language of the statute should be interpreted as incorporating an entire 
classification system, rather than just the set of descriptions it expressly 
references, especially considering that the SIC classification system is used for the 
completely unrelated purposes of providing economic and statistical information 
for the federal government. 
Under the Commission's interpretation of the statute, no matter how closely 
a description from the Manufacturing Division fits an establishment, it can never 
actually be described in that Division if there is an SIC Code from another 
Division that the Commission believes is a better fit. Taken to its logical extreme, 
the Commission's interpretation of the statute could require searching the entire 
SIC Manual in each case to find the SIC Code that provides the best description. 
Instead of taking upon itself the unnecessary task of determining the "best" SIC 
Code for Atlas, the Commission should have dealt with the true issue in this 
case—namely, whether Atlas' undisputed primary activity of producing ferrous 
and nonferrous metals is "described in" the Manufacturing Division of the SIC 
Manual. 
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No "Bright Line Test" Can Totally Eliminate the Need For an 
Analytical Determination by the Tax Commission 
According to the Commission, the legislature used the Manufacturing 
Division of the SIC Manual to establish a "'bright-line' test" for the sales tax 
exemption. (R. at 24.) However, to the extent that there is such a line, it must be 
drawn in the right place. As noted, the statute requires only that the establishment 
be "described in" the Manufacturing Division, instead of "classified in" that 
Division, suggesting that the legislature intended to borrow this portion of the SIC 
Manual as a tool for description without actually adopting the Manual's 
classification system. 
In addition, from an administrative standpoint, a "bright line" test may well 
serve to eliminate the often difficult line drawing dynamics associated with 
determining eligibility for a tax exemption. In reality, however, the search for the 
so-called "bright line" may result in an even more ambiguous and arbitrary 
application. In the name of a "bright line" standard, the Commission is attempting 
to rewrite the statute to adopt the entire SIC Code classification system—a 
classification system that has been designed for the completely unrelated purposes 
of supplying statistical and economic information. Furthermore, adoption of the 
entire system would require that the Tax Commission either maintain current 
information on the processes and determinations of the U.S. Department of Labor 
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or that it simply adopt whatever determination was made by the appropriate 
administrative agency. The statute does not provide for either of these approaches. 
It could be argued, in fact, that the Commission's position—namely, that an 
establishment that is clearly described by the terms of an SIC Code within the 
Manufacturing Division will not qualify if there happens to be an even better 
description in an SIC Code from another Division—provides a murkier standard 
than the "described in" standard expressly stated in the statute. For example, the 
"best described in" standard could yield a situation where an establishment that is 
at best marginally described in the Manufacturing Division may qualify for the 
exemption simply because it is not described in any other SIC Code. Thus, the 
Commission's ruling extinguishes the bright-line because determining 
qualification could require searching every single Code in the SIC Manual to 
determine if there is one that provides a better description. 
The true test adopted by the legislature is found in the express language of 
the statute—is this "an establishment described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999" of the 
1987 SIC Manual. In some cases, these SIC Codes will clearly apply. In other 
cases, they will clearly not apply. To this extent, there may be a bright line. 
However, in many other cases, the statutory test cannot be applied so easily. This 
is particularly true with respect to new manufacturing activities that did not exist 
at the time the 1987 SIC Manual was published. In these situations, there really is 
no bright line, despite the desire for one. In such cases, of which Atlas is one, the 
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determination of whether the statutory standard is applicable requires the 
Commission to analyze and weigh actual evidence in making its determination and 
to make its determination on that evidence. 
In summary, based on the actual language of the sales tax exemption 
statute, the real issue in this case is whether Atlas' undisputed primary activity of 
producing ferrous and nonferrous metals is "described in" the Manufacturing 
Division of the SIC Manual. The Commission must make that determination on 
the evidence presented in the record before it. 
III. The Commission's Conclusions of Law are Entitled to No 
Deference from the Court and its Findings of Fact Must be Overturned 
Unless Supported by Substantial Evidence. 
A. The Commission Reached Conclusions of Law which are 
Entitled to No Deference by the Court. 
In its brief, the Commission argues that "whether a particular SIC code 
applies to an establishment is a factual determination made by taking into account 
all of the activities of the establishment. . . . " (Br. of Appellee at 10.) Although it 
is true that a factual determination is required, it is first necessary to determine the 
law that is to be applied to the facts. In this case, the Commission has interpreted 
the statutory language "described in" to mean "best described in," has added a 
"primary activity" test not found in the statute, and has construed an SIC Code 
provision to require similarity to a sample list of products given. All of these 
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interpretations of the statute (and the SIC Code) are purely conclusions of law, and 
there is no factual component to them. 
Utah Code § 59-1-610(1) provides that the Court shall "grant the 
commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a correction 
of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a 
statute at issue before the appellate court." The Commission argues that even if 
the rulings below involved conclusions of law, "the Court should give deference to 
the Tax Commission" because the statute at issue provides that "the commission 
shall by rule define . . . 'establishment'" (Br. of Appellee at 19; Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-104(15)(b).) However, the Commission's limited discretion under the 
statute is not relevant to the issues in this case. First, the discretion is to be 
exercised by rule, presumably referring to the published rules of the Tax 
Commission. More importantly, the relevant discretion is limited to defining the 
word "establishment." 
The Commission's brief suggests that there is a grant of discretion to the 
Commission because "the statute itself equates 'manufacturing facility' and 
'establishment'" (Br. of Appellee at 19.) However, pursuant to the actual 
language of the statute, the term "manufacturing facility means an establishment 
described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999" of the 1987 SIC Manual. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-104(15)(a). The issue is not whether Atlas is an establishment, but 
whether it is an establishment described in the required SIC Codes. Because 
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"there is no explicit grant of discretion to the Commission to interpret section 59-
12-104(15) and the SIC Codes," its conclusions of law are entitled to no deference 
from the Court, and should be reviewed based on a correction of error standard. 
Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
B. The Commission's Findings of Fact are Not Supported by 
Substantial Evidence. 
In its brief, the Commission argues that Atlas "has failed to marshal the 
factual evidence challenging its position." (Br. of Appellee at 13.) Of course, the 
Commission's conclusions of law do not involve factual determinations and there 
is therefore no need to marshal any evidence in this regard. However, the 
Commission did make a finding of fact that SIC Code 5093, Scrap and Waste 
Materials, is "the SIC code that best describes" Atlas. (R. at 26.) In its brief, the 
Commission argues that there is substantial evidence to support this finding and 
then recites that evidence (Br. of Appellee at 15-16.) 
Before reviewing the Commission's "substantial evidence," it must be 
noted once again that Atlas disagrees with the "best described in" standard used by 
the Commission, and believes that the statute only requires the establishment to be 
described in the Manufacturing Division. If Atlas' interpretation of the law is 
correct, then any evidence offered to show that Atlas is described in SIC Code 
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5093 is based upon a misinterpretation of the statute and is therefore irrelevant to 
this case. 
However, regardless of which construction of the statute is correct, the 
Commission's findings still need to be supported by substantial evidence. 
Therefore, it is helpful to compare the evidence offered in support of finding that 
Atlas was described in the Manufacturing Division with the evidence offered in 
support of placing Atlas in SIC Code 5093. 
Evidence Offered by Atlas: 
Atlas called five witnesses who testified during two days of 
hearings for the purpose of demonstrating that Atlas was primarily 
engaged in manufacturing ferrous and nonferrous metals within the 
meaning of SIC Codes 3313 and 3399. Much of that evidence is set 
forth in pages 18 through 28 of Atlas' opening brief. The 
Commission did not challenge any of the testimony offered by Atlas. 
In its ruling, the Commission stated that Atlas "presented substantial 
evidence to persuade the Commission that it is a manufacturer," and 
then proceeded to list "some of that evidence" over the next two 
pages of the opinion. (R. at 22-24.) Atlas also offered substantial 
evidence intended to distinguish its activities from those described in 
SIC Code 5093 (See, e.g.. Findings of Fact 6 through 11). 
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Evidence Offered by the Auditing Division: 
Following the two pages of Atlas' "substantial evidence" 
summarized by the Commission in its ruling, there is one short 
paragraph indicating the "position" and the arguments of the 
Auditing Division without reference to a single piece of evidence. 
(R. at 24.) The Auditing Division called only two witnesses, both of 
whom were its own auditors. That testimony was not evidentiary in 
nature but instead focused on the mechanics of carrying out the 
audit. The Auditing Division called no witnesses and offered no 
evidence to show that Atlas was not described in the Manufacturing 
Division. 
According to the Commission's brief, "the testimony of the 
Auditing Division's witnesses, who had seen Atlas Steel's activities 
through the audit process, was that Atlas Steel merely took in these 
different scrap materials[,] sorted them, and sold them at wholesale 
to [its] customers." (Br. of Appellee at 17.) However, as noted in 
Atlas' opening brief, when questioned by the Commission about 
whether a mechanical change had occurred, one of the Auditing 
Division's own witnesses stated: "And prior to yesterday, I couldn't 
have spoken to that. But listening to the testimony of Mr. Groll [the 
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expert witness for Atlas], I believe it was, I guess there was a 
mechanical change." (Tr. at 219.) 
In its brief, the Commission recites the evidence supporting 
its "conclusion that Atlas Steel was properly classified under SIC 
Code 5093." (Br. of Appellee at 15-16.) Drawing from the entire 
record, the Commission's evidence basically consists of a yellow 
pages advertisement by Atlas referring to its scrap metal processing 
and recycling activities, Atlas' Crusher and Dismantlers licenses, a 
number of pictures which were actually presented by Atlas to show 
the types of materials it processes, and some purchase orders and 
invoices also submitted by Atlas. (Br. of Appellee at 15-16.) What 
2 The overall hearing record shows that these exhibits were minor issues for 
consideration. The yellow pages advertisement was meant merely to indicate to 
the general public that it could dispose of various commonly-held metal items at 
the Atlas facility, and simply targeted an additional source of raw materials. 
Furthermore, nothing in the advertisement stated or implied that the items being 
sought were dismantled for resale as parts. Possession of a Crusher and 
Dismantlers license was simply a matter of avoiding any licensing problems. 
Crushing is actually an important part of the preparation of ferrous and nonferrous 
metals. 
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is significant about this evidence is that all of it supports Atlas' 
position that it is described in the Manufacturing Division.3 
The only other evidence identified in the Commission's brief 
arises from the cross-examination of two of Atlas' witnesses. First, 
Thomas Groll acknowledged that there were some similarities 
between Atlas' activities and those described in SIC Code 5093. (Br. 
of Appellee at 16.) Atlas has never argued that there are not 
similarities between the two. However, moments later Mr. Groll 
was asked whether the materials produced by an auto wrecker or 
dismantler could be used by the steel mini-mills to which Atlas sold 
its products and replied that they could not. (Tr. at 104.) More 
importantly, if the correct construction of the statute is applied, Mr. 
Groll's testimony taken as a whole supports a finding that Atlas is 
3 The Commission indicates that the invoices and purchase orders taken into 
evidence referred to Atlas' product as scrap, not as a manufactured commodity. 
(Brief of Appellee at 16.) However, at the hearing, Atlas offered evidence to show 
that steel scrap is a manufactured commodity, and many different grades of scrap 
are actually traded on the commodities exchange. (See, e.g., Exhibits Nos. P-22, 
P-23, and P-29; see also the extensive testimony from Craig Feldman, a witness 
called by Atlas, concerning the commodities market for steel scrap (Tr. at 52-59)). 
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described in the Manufacturing Division (See Br. of Appellant at 
18-28.) 
Second, when asked if Atlas used any furnace, smelting, or 
heat treatment to prepare its product, Craig Feldman responded that 
it did not. (Br. of Appellee at 16; Tr. at 65.) This evidence has 
nothing to do with classification under 5093, but is cited in the 
Commission's brief to show that Atlas does not cause a chemical 
change in the materials it produces. Atlas has presented abundant 
evidence in its opening brief that the Manufacturing Division 
requires either a chemical or a mechanical change, and that either of 
these can occur without the use of heat. (Br. of Appellant at 21-28.) 
Notwithstanding the disparity of the evidence referenced above, and 
without citing any evidence in support of its conclusion, the Commission 
found that "the SIC code that best describes this establishment is code 
5093, Scrap and Waste Materials." (R. at 26.) To assert that this finding is 
supported by "substantial evidence" is to render that term meaningless. 
In Larson Limestone Company v. State of Utah, 903 P.2d 429 (Utah 
1995), the Court reviewed the substantial evidence standard and concluded: 
"Thus, under the substantial evidence test, this court must determine if the 
findings of fact were reasonable and rational." Given the fact that the 
Commission's ruling fails to identify what evidence, if any, it relied upon in 
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determining the "best" SIC Code and the fact that, with a few minor 
exceptions such as a yellow pages ad and a pair of licenses, all of the 
evidence in the record was offered in support of Atlas' position that it is a 
manufacturer, the Commission's finding is neither reasonable nor rational. 
Furthermore, if the statute is correctly construed, the meager evidence 
supporting classification under SIC Code 5093 becomes irrelevant and the 
only issue is whether Atlas is described in the Manufacturing Division. 
The Commission also found that Atlas "does not use either an 
electrometallurgical or a metallothermic process and therefore is not an 
establishment described in SIC Code 3313." (R. at 25,26.) In its brief, the 
Commission also argues that Atlas does not use an electrometallurgical process 
within the meaning of SIC Code 3313. (Br. of Appellee at 22.) However, the only 
evidence cited in support of this argument is Craig Feldman's statement that Atlas 
did not use heat in its operation. As noted above, the use of heat is not necessary 
to qualification under SIC Code 3313, and Atlas has demonstrated the lack of any 
evidence to support the Commission's finding in its opening brief (Br. of 
Appellant at 21-28.) 
The Commission's brief also suggests that Thomas Groll was not qualified 
to give expert testimony. (Br. of Appellee at 18-19.) However, Mr. Groll listed 
the following credentials that clearly demonstrate his expertise with respect to the 
testimony he gave: (a) current director of mill services with the David Joseph 
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Company; (b) twelve total years in the steel and scrap industry, with five of those 
years in melting and casting, and seven years in scrap; (c) responsibility for 
ensuring scrap quality for the steel mill and for performing chemical analyses of 
scrap sources; and (d) Bachelor of Science in material science and metallurgical 
engineering, including extensive chemical classes and extractive classes related to 
steel making. (Tr. 83, 97, 98.) When asked by counsel for the Auditing Division if 
he considered himself to be an expert in manufacturing, Mr. Groll responded: "As 
it relates to scrap going to the steel industry, yes." (Tr. at 98.) These credentials 
were not challenged either by counsel for the Auditing Division or by the 
Commission. 
In conclusion, Atlas has never challenged the premise that it bears the 
burden of proof in this case. However, a review of the entire record demonstrates 
substantial evidence to support its position with virtually no evidence offered in 
support of the conclusions reached by the Commission. Furthermore, nothing in 
the Commission's ruling explains any deficiency or flaws with the evidence 
offered. Finally, the fact that Atlas has a burden of proof to show that the 
Commission's findings of fact are not based upon substantial evidence does not 
eliminate the basic principle that the Commission must base its decision on the 
evidence presented to it. 
18 
IV, The Subsequent Change in the Law is not Evidence that Atlas was 
not a Manufacturer under the Law Governing this Case. 
The Commission's brief quotes the testimony of former State Senator 
David Buhler, one of Atlas' witnesses, in support of the proposition that the later 
addition of a special provision in the law to include scrap recyclers within the 
manufacturing sales tax exemption demonstrates that the law governing this case 
did not include Atlas in its definition of a manufacturing facility. Mr. Buhler 
sponsored the 1997 legislation that expressly included recyclers as manufacturers 
regardless of their classification under the SIC Code. (Tr. at 141.) 
The appellant has never asserted that the 1997 statutory change was the 
governing law for the audit period in question. However, the dynamics associated 
with the 1997 change are illustrative of the challenges of utilizing the SIC Codes. 
Furthermore, contrary to the statement in the Commission's brief, Atlas views the 
Buhler testimony as buttressing the position that Atlas should have been 
considered a manufacturer all along. Because the Commission has raised Senator 
Buhler's testimony in its brief, Atlas will briefly respond. (Br. of Appellee at 25.) 
Atlas was subject to the audits that are the basis of this appeal in 1994 and 
1996. Atlas felt strongly that its activities were considered to be manufacturing 
and thus challenged the position of the Auditing Division. However, without 
immediate knowledge of the litigation's outcome, Atlas also sought legislative 
clarification in favor of its position as well. It is important to note that the 
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legislation explicitly granting the exemption to facilities such as Atlas was enacted 
prior to the hearing on this matter. The legislation in question was passed during 
the 1997 General Session. The hearing on this matter was held in November 
1999. In other words, Atlas' legislative efforts were not in response to the 
Commission's determination but in response to issues raised by the initial audit. 
Mr. Buhler suggested that the change in the law occurred because scrap 
recyclers "had a very compelling argument that they in fact were manufacturers 
and were it not for using the SIC codes that they would be considered 
manufacturers and eligible for the exemption." (Br. of Appellee at 25; Tr. at 141.) 
Mr. Buhler also testified that he agreed to sponsor the bill after being contacted by 
a representative of the Utah Recyclers Association, of which Atlas is a member, 
and also meeting with a number of recyclers who told him about "their situation." 
(Tr.atl41.) 
Mr. Buhler also testified that the new legislation was introduced because 
"this was an issue of fairness and something that we ought to clarify in the law to 
make it absolutely clear that they were in fact manufacturers." (Tr. at 141.)4 In the 
hearing, Mr. Buhler also agreed with the statement that the change in the law was 
4
 Senator Buhler also suggested that he could have used the "old duck test" to 
propose that scrap recyclers were really manufacturers: "if it walks like a duck, 
looks like a duck, etc." (Tr. at 142.) 
20 
"a technical change to the definition of manufacturer and not a new exemption" 
and stated that he "saw it as a clarification." (Tr. at 143, 145.) Finally, when 
asked if the Utah Legislature had answered the question whether recyclers should 
be treated as manufacturers, he responded: "Well, I think that we have—certainly 
when we passed this bill clarifying it we essentially said that this also is a 
manufacturer." (Tr. at 146.) 
When the entirety of Mr. Buhler's testimony is taken into account, it clearly 
does not support the Commission's proposition that the 1997 legislative action 
demonstrates that the law governing this case could not apply to scrap recyclers. 
Rather, the Buhler testimony and the legislative action actually support the 
conclusion that the 1997 statute was intended to clarify that scrap recyclers such as 
Atlas should have been considered manufacturers even under the old statute. 
Simply put, when apprised of the potential problem, the Utah Legislature moved 
immediately and virtually unanimously to classify Atlas and other scrap recyclers 
as a manufacturer notwithstanding any SIC concerns. (Tr. at 141, 146.) 
DATED this 5th day of April, 2002. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
By f^X^^rz^ £ /XL*&iZ.—,, 
^l^oger O. Tew 
David E. Sloan 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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